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THE INSURER'S DUTY TO DEFEND UNDER
A LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICY
A standard liability insurance policy 1 provides that the insurance
company shall pay all sunms which the insured becomes legally obligated to
pay as damages because of injury caused by accident and arising, for
example, out of the ownership of an automobile or the proprietorship of
a bar. Coverage is limited by express exclusions. A typical example of
such an exclusion is an intentional injury committed either by the named
insured or at his direction. In a second provision the insurance company
usually further agrees, with respect to such coverage, to defend any suit
against the insured alleging such injury and seeking damages on account
thereof, even if such suit is groundless, false or fraudulent. It is this duty
to defend provision, so deceptive in its simplicity, that is of concern here.
To begin with, the so-called insurer's dilemma must be considered.
If the insurer does not defend, the insured may suffer a larger judgment
than if the insurer had been conducting the lawsuit, and the insurer may be
required to pay this judgment. By relinquishing control, the insurer also
runs the risk that the insured may allow a claim that appears to the
insurer to be either clearly outside the policy or ambiguous as to coverage
to develop into a judgment within coverage. If the insurer does defend,
and the third party wins, the insurer risks being barred from later asserting
that the judgment falls outside the primary coverage of the first provision.
The insured, on the other hand, may be surprised to find himself facing a
threat of liability under factual circumstances which he thought would
compel his insurance company to defend him but which, in fact, might not
2
I. WHEN THE INSURER MUST DEFEND-THE GENERAL RULE
In most situations the insurer and the insured can be reliably informed
of the nature of the third party's claim from the complaint and can agree
on coverage: if the primary coverage provision of the policy would require
the insurer to pay a judgment based on the injury alleged, it must defend;
if not, it need not defend. This, the general rule,3 appears attractive be-
cause it seems to fall squarely within the "alleging such injury" language in
the policy. When pleading requirements were strict and variances of proof
from pleadings were not tolerated,4 such a rule might have been completely
1 For a complete specimen form of standard provisions used in automobile policies,
see PATTERSON & YOUNG, CASES ON INSURANCE 697-711 (4th ed. 1961).
2 Some texts set out the range of these various problems. E.g., GREGORY & KAL-
VERN, CASES ON TORTS 550-608 (1959) ; PATTERSON & YOUNG, op. Cit. supra note 1,
at 596-632.
8 Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 458 (1956) ; 7A APPLEmAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE
§4683 (1962).
4 See generally SHIPMAN, COMMON-LAW PLEADING (3d ed. Ballantine 1923).
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dependable. But today's relaxed pleading requirements, notably the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, are designed only to put an opposing
party on notice 5 and offer less assurance that the third party's complaint
will accurately reflect its claim or predict the basis of any relief. The ease
with which amendments to the pleadings to conform to the evidence may
be made, absent prejudice to an opposing party,0 would by itself be enough
to make the complaint a poor measure of what is to follow. For example,
the gravamen of a third party's complaint purporting to sound in inten-
tional tort might actually be negligence. If the insured's policy covered
accidental injury and excluded intentional injury, a mechanical applica-
tion of the general rule might relieve the insurer of any obligation to defend
and, more importantly, might have the vice of foreclosing consideration of
whether the insurer's duty to defend should extend to the case.7
The factual situation just posited reveals the disadvantages of apply-
ing the general rule to a case in which the third party's complaint is clearly
outside the policy. Before discussing that problem, a review of how the
rule works when the complaint is not clearly outside the policy will be
made. Germane to this review are those cases in which the third party's
complaint either is ambiguous when read against the description of cover-
age in the policy or has two counts, one within the policy and the other
outside it. As an example of such a case, assume that a manufacturer has
insurance covering a breach of warranty on its product and that this cover-
age expressly extends to its retailer making the same warranty. Assume
further that a third party who bought the manufacturer's product from the
retailer was injured and brings an action against the retailer alleging (1)
that the retailer negligently failed to inspect the product before selling it
and (2) that the retailer breached its express warranty. If the alleged
warranty promised no more than the manufacturer's warranty, then the
third party's complaint would be partly within and partly outside the manu-
facturer's policy.8 Although courts might differ on the consequences of an
insurer's breach of its duty to defend or on how an insurer could fulfill its
duty in such a case, they would virtually all recognize the insurer's duty to
5 See, e.g., CLARK, CODE PLEADING 56-57 (2d ed. 1947).
6E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 15(b).
7 Compare Lawrence v. Northwest Cas. Co., 50 Wash. 2d 282, 311 P.2d 670
(1957) (insurer required to pay defense costs for suit alleging alternatively negligent
or intentional injury but not for earlier suit alleging only intentional injury and
resulting in hung jury), with McGettrick v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 264 F.2d 883 (2d Cir.
1959) (insurer required to pay defense costs even though suit was one alleging inten-
tional tort). A court's inability to rule, with only the third party's allegations before
it, on the insurer's obligation to pay a possible future judgment suggests that the gen-
eral rule does not always apply to threats of liability within the primary coverage.
Coinpare Green v. Aetna Ins. Co., 349 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1965) (declaratory judgment
that insurer has no duty to defend but that question of primary coverage liability is not
foreclosed), with Smedley Co. v. Employers Mut. Ins. Co., 143 Conn. 510, 123 A.2d
755 (1956) (insurer not assessed defense costs for refusing to defend suit alleging
injury outside the policy; stipulated facts did not vary from allegations).
8 Cf. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 199 F. Supp. 769 (N.D.
IIl. 1961).
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defend.9 Courts reach this result by resolving any uncertainty in whether
a multiple count or ambiguous complaint is one "alleging such injury"
against the maker of the insurance contract, the insurer. The insurer
would not be entitled, for example, to a determination of which of two
alternative counts represents the third party's real claim, because the
insurer has agreed to defend "even if such suit is groundless ... " .
Some courts have modified the extent of the insurer's duty to defend
against such a multiple count or ambiguous complaint. They only require
the insurer to defend until it appears that the third party's lawsuit has been
confined to claims outside of policy coverage.'1 The modification so stated
sounds like a fair compromise, but it appears to ignore the insurer's natural
tendency to confine the third party's action to claims outside of coverage as
soon as possible, even at the expense of the insured's interests.1 For
example, if the insurer's policy excluded injury to the insured's employees
from coverage, an admission by the insurer defending the insured that an
allegedly injured plaintiff was an employee at the time of the injury would
place the claim outside the policy. But such an admission might harm
the insured if, for instance, he did not have workmen's compensation in-
surance ' or if the standard of care due an automobile passenger under
a guest statute turned on whether he was an employee or simply a guest.14
It is unclear how courts would reconcile the relief afforded to the insurer
by this modified duty to defend rule with the waiver and estoppel doctrines.
These doctrines 1 bar the insurer from asserting certain policy defenses in
9 E.g., American Indem. Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 195 F.2d 353 (6th Cir.
1952) ; Lee v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 178 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1949) (L. Hand, J.) ;
Continental Cas. Co. v. Reinhardt, 247 F. Supp. 173 (D. Ore. 1965) ; Moffat v. Metro-
politan Cas. Ins. Co., 238 F. Supp. 165 (M.D. Pa. 1964) ; Lawrence v. Northwest Cas.
Co., 50 Wash. 2d 282, 311 P.2d 670 (1957) ; Alm v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 369 P.2d
216 (Wyo. 1962). Contra, Stout v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 201 F. Supp. 647
(M.D.N.C.), aff'd, 307 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1962) (insured previously pleaded guilty
to manslaughter; declaratory judgment that insurer not required to defend suit alleging
alternatively negligent and intentional killing where court found insured had acted
intentionally) ; see Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Hall, 246 F. Supp. 64 (E.D.S.C.
1965) (declaratory judgment of no duty to defend based on stipulated facts) ; Fed-
erated Mut. Implement & Hardware Ins. Co. v. Gupton, 211 F. Supp. 509 (E.D.S.C.
1965) (same).
10 See Aim v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 369 P.2d 216 (Wyo. 1962).
11 E.g., Lee v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 178 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1949) (L. Hand, J.)
(dictum); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 199 F. Supp. 769 (N.D.
Ill. 1961); Vappi & Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 204 N.E.2d 273 (Mass. 1965).
12 See Roos, The Obligation To Defend and Some Related Problems, 13 HASTINGS
L.J.-206, 211-13 (1961).
13 Cf. Crum v. Anchor Cas. Co., 264 Minn. 378, 119 N.W.2d 703 (1963).
14 Cf. Journal Pub. Co. v. General Cas. Co., 210 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1954).
15 "Waiver" is an intentional relinquishment of a known right, and "estoppel"
precludes one from denying a representation relied on by another who would be
prejudiced by the denial. The two doctrines in this context, however, amount to
the same protection as they are applied. See generally VAN CE, I-ADBOOK ON THE
LAW OF INsURANcE ch. 9 (3d ed. Anderson 1951) ; Morris, Waiver and Estoppel in
Instrance Policy Litigation, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 925 (1957). Although they are dis-
tinguished, James v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 349 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1965), and
cases have been held to turn on the distinction, e.g., Andover v. Hartford Acc.
& Indem. Co., 217 A.2d 60 (Conn. 1966), such distinctions become fine when
knowledge of the right relinquished is inferred from the circumstances; compare
Jenkins v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 152 Conn. 249, 205 A.2d 780 (1964),
with Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963) (habeas corpus case), and Comment,
INSURER'S DUTY TO DEFEND
order to prevent it from obtaining any advantage vis-a-vis the insured
flowing from its conduct of the insured's defense.1
6
One court seems to have required the insured to show actual prejudice
from the insurer's interim defense before the insured could invoke
estoppel. 1. In cases in which the insurer assumes the complete defense,
however, the insured is not usually required to prove that he was misled or
prejudiced by the insurer's defense.' 8 The reasons for so applying the
waiver and estoppel doctrines to complete defenses seem equally applicable
to cases in which the insurer assumes only part of the defense. Such a
broad prophylaxis would protect both the insured and the legal profession.
If the insured were in fact prejudiced by the insurer's defense, the insured
would find it difficult to carry his burden of proof. His argument would
be hypothetical and take the form of "but for the insurer's defense .... "
To substantiate his hypothesis he would have to rely on evidence that
might be stale, since his action on the policy against the insurer would
come after the third party's action. Moreover, since his claim, if proven,
would tend to discredit a member of the bar, it might not have a sym-
pathetic reception. Most importantly, there is the danger that the insurer
could profit from its position of trust at the expense of the insured.19 The
114 U. PA. L. REv. 451 (1966), and prejudice from the insurer's assumption of the
defense is conclusively presumed, Pendleton v. Pan Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 317 F.2d
96 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 905 (1963), order modified, 326 F.2d 760 (1964).
16E.g., Pendleton v. Pan Am. Fire. & Cas. Co., supra note 15; Jenkins v. In-
demnity Ins. Co. of North America, supra note 15. See generally 8 APPLEmAN, op.
cit. supra note 3, §4747; Morris, supra note 15.
17 journal Pub. Co. v. General Cas. Co., 210 F.2d 202, 205 (9th Cir. 1954)
(lower court's finding sustained by the record). See also Note, Inmurance Company's
Dilemma: Defending Actions Against the Assured, 2 STAN. L. REV. 383 (1950),
suggesting that waiver be implied only where prejudice is shown and that waiver
not be implied in any event before noncoverage is known to the insurer.
18 See Note, Liability Insurance Policy Defenses and the Duty To Defend, 68
HARv. L. Rxv. 1436, 1444-45 (1955).
19 Burish v. Dignon, 416 Pa. 486, 206 A.2d 497 (1965), involved a two car colli-
sion at an intersection. An attorney retained by the insurer defended an action
against the insured driver by the third party, the other driver. The insured retained
another attorney in the same action to press a counterclaim against the third party.
After losing, the insured argued on appeal that the trial judge had abused his dis-
cretion in allowing only the insured's attorney, and not the insurer's attorney as
well, to make a summation to the jury, since there was a close factual issue. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the trial judge had not abused his discretion
in limiting the number of summations in behalf of the insured to the number made
in behalf of the third party.
Of interest here is the question raised by what the insured's attorney planned
to urge on summation. The insured's own attorney argued to the jury that the third
party had been negligent and that the insured had not been contributorily negligent.
The insurer's attorney was going to argue that both parties were negligent and that
neither should recover. If that latter argument had prevailed, query whether the
insured could have maintained an action on the policy on the theory that through a
conflict of interest the insurer's attorney had prejudiced the insured's counterclaim.
The insurer might have responded on two grounds: (1) It agreed only to defend
certain suits against the insured and not to protect any other claims that the insured
might have; and (2) the insured could have repudiated the insurance policy and
refused to permit the insurer to defend.
The difficulties in such a case are much like those in the case where the same
insurer has insured both parties. See O'Morrow v. Borad, 27 Cal. 2d 815, 167 P.2d
483 (1946). It has been suggested that the problems inherent in a situation like
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key figure in causing any such abuse is the insurer's attorney, who would
be the one faced with the potential conflict of interest. The interest of the
legal profession as a whole would seem to demand that this attorney's
conduct be beyond possible reproach 2 0 Furthermore, once the insurer has
assumed the insured's defense, the insured is encouraged, and even required
by his policy, to cooperate fully with, do nothing independently of, and be
completely candid with "his" attorney. Suspicion that the insurer's attor-
ney and investigators may be building a case for the insurer at the expense
of the insured might cause the insured to respond guardedly; in the long
run this would be to neither party's advantage.2 '
The problem, then, is that in every instance in which the third party's
complaint on its face is both within and outside the policy, the defending
insurer has a potential conflict of interest. This potential conflict occurs
whether the governing rule requires the insurer to defend throughout or
to defend until the third party's action has been confined to claims outside
the policy. The nub of any resolution of the problem lies in the recognition
that the duty to defend can be separated into two distinct elements: (1) the
insurer's right to control the insured's defense; and (2) the insurer's
obligation to pay for the costs of this defense. Control, and along with it
the power to "shape" the third party's claim in a manner inconsistent with
the insured's interest, insofar as this is possible from a defensive posture,
is the element causing a potential conflict of interest. Thus, even though
there is absent in the policy any such distinction between control and
cost responsibility, that absence must be balanced against the necessity of
maintaining public confidence in the judicial process and requires that some
sort of check be placed on the insurer's right to have its attorneys conduct
the defense.22  Such a check could be created by exacting a high price for
the right: the insurer would be permitted to assume the defense of an
ambiguous or multiple count complaint only at the risk of later being
estopped-under a strict standard-from denying coverage.m
O'Morrow could be avoided by trying each action separately. Casper, The Defense
of Automobile Collision Cases by Insurers in Pennsylvania, 60 DiCm. L. REV. 171
(1956). The suggestion would seem equally applicable to Burish. However, the
suggestion might be limited by the effects of collateral estoppel or mandatory joinder
of claims, neither of which the third party could be expected to waive in advance.
20 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Keller, 17 Ill. App. 2d 44, 149 N.E.2d 482 (1958);
Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. McConnaughy, 228 Md. 1, 179 A.2d 117 (1962); American
Employers Ins. Co. v. Goble Aircraft Specialties, Inc., 205 Misc. 1066, 131 N.Y.S.2d
393 (Sup. Ct. 1954) ; Perkoski v. Wilson, 371 Pa. 553, 92 A.2d 189 (1952) ; Note,
Duty of Attorney Appointed by Liability Insurance Company, 14 CLEV.-MAR. L. RFv.
375 (1965).21 See Chitty v. State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co., 36 F.R.D. 37 (E.D.S.C. 1964)
(insured may have discovery against insurer under federal rule 34 in action on policy) ;
Henke v. Iowa Home Mut. Cas. Co., 249 Iowa 614, 87 N.W.2d 920 (1958) ; 72 HAuv.
L. REv. 766 (1959). But cf. Manning v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 235 F.
Supp. 615 (W.D.N.C. 1964) (insurer's correspondence privileged against disclosure
to third party in action on the policy).
22 See Kaplan, Forbidden Retainers, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 914, 924-26 (1956).
This distinction between actual control of a defense and the obligation to pay
defense costs was recognized, in effect, in an action for declaratory judgment initiated
after the third party's complaint had been filed. Prashker v. United States Guar.
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II. TiE EFFECT OF A JUDGMENT
It should follow from this delicate two-fold balancing of interests that
if the insurer chose to relinquish control of the defense in order to
avoid a conflict of interest, it would later be free to argue that the grounds
on which any judgment purports to be based are outside the policy, even
though the insurer would be liable for defense costs. Nonetheless there is
a split of authority. According to the better rule, whether the grounds
on which a judgment against the insured was entered were within cover-
age would be a contestable issue. 4 But some courts have held that since
the insurer wrongfully breached its contractual duty to defend the insured,
it should be liable for the consequences of that breach-the judgment that
the insured suffered-regardless of the grounds for the judgment25 It
Co., 1 N.Y.2d 584, 136 N.E.2d 871, 154 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1956) (insured should select
attorneys and the insurer would be liable for the reasonable value of their services).
In fact, any time that an insurer has refused to defend a suit which is ambiguous as
to coverage and the insurer is charged with defense costs after the suit has been
completed, the two elements of the duty to defend have necessarily been separated.
E.g., Moffat v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co., 238 F. Supp. 165 (M.D. Pa. 1964) (in-
surer required to reimburse the insured for the defense of a suit alleging (1) an
intentional injury, which was excluded from coverage, and (2) facts within coverage).
24Lee v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 178 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1949) (L. Hand, J.) ;
Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Ratliff, 242 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Ark. 1965) ; Moffat v. Metro-
politan Cas. Ins. Co., mupra note 23.
The clearest instance of the separability of the issues of liability for defense
costs and liability for the amount of judgment is the case in which the insured has
suffered a judgment, had no defense expenses and seeks to hold the insurer liable
for the judgment because it failed to defend, and there is no recovery. In McCarthy
v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 24 Misc. 2d 79, 80, 204 N.Y.S.2d 420, 421 (Sup. Ct.
1960), the court said: "The fact that defendant may have had an obligation to defend
Branch or that he violated such obligation may render him liable in damages to
Branch, had Branch expended money to defend himself. It does not by itself render
defendant liable for the judgment. There is a distinction between liability and
coverage. . . ." Accord, Gedeon v. State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co., 410 Pa. 55,
188 A.2d 320 (1963); see Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654,
659-60, 328 P.2d 198, 201 (1958), 47 GEo. L.J. 601 (1959) ; 107 U. PA. L. Rxv. 571
(1959).
2 5 E.g., Leonardi v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 212 F.2d 887 (2d Cir. 1954) (insurer
liable for judgment even though it appeared that the prior court, in effect, directed a
verdict against the third party on the only issue within the policy).
Using a variation of the above approach, the insured in the Gedeon case, supra
note 24, instituted a second case in federal court in a further effort to recover the
amount of the judgment he had suffered. Gedeon v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 227 F. Supp. 342 (W.D. Pa. 1964). This time his claim was based on the in-
surer's breach of its pretrial defense obligations to investigate and settle, if possible,
as opposed to its obligation to defend in court, which was res judicata. The relief
requested was damages in the amount of the judgment, which was greater than the
policy dollar limits. The Third Circuit reversed a summary judgment for the insurer.
342 F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 1965) ; see King v. Automobile Underwriters, Inc., 409 Pa. 608,
187 A.2d 584 (1963).
Some secondary authorities have made broad statements to the effect that the
insurer's liability for the amount of judgment categorically follows from its liability for
defense costs. E.g., 7 Am. Jut. 2D Automobile Insurance § 166 (1963) ; Annot, 49
A.L.R.2d 694, 717 (1957) ; 14 COUcH, INSURAcFc 2D § 51: 54, at 552 (1965) : "The in-
surer's unjustified refusal to defend makes it bound to pay the amount of the judgment
rendered against the insured, or of any settlement made in good faith by the insured
in the action brought against him by the injured party." Seemingly relying on such
statements, some courts disregard the possibility that the grounds of a judgment may
be outside the policy. E.g., Sims v. Illinois Natl Cas. Co., 43 Ill. App. 2d 184, 193
N.E.2d 123 (1963).
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would seem that there is no causal nexus, in the usual legal sense, between
the insurer's refusal to defend and the judgment that the insured suffered.
If the insured's counsel were not impeached and if there were no special
circumstances, the insured would have suffered the judgment in any event.
Perhaps the unarticulated rationale for these decisions is that the courts
are reluctant to permit an insurer to place itself in a better position by
refusing to fulfill its duty to defend than it would have been in had it
defended; 2 6 if the insurer actually had defended, it might then have been
estopped from asserting the policy defense that the judgment was outside
the policy. This rationale is not persuasive, because the very risk which
estoppel is designed to meet is not present, since the insurer has not
defended.
Even accepting the "better" rule, the insurer's freedom to argue that
a judgment, as entered, is not within the policy might only be a limited
benefit, for while the insurer would no longer have any control over the
form a judgment might take, the insured would. The shift in control
avoids the insurer's conflict of interest, but with the insured controlling his
own defense the insurer's interests might not be fully protected. A com-
promise might be collaboration.2 7  The presence of the insurer's attorney
might tend to discourage attempts to adopt a defense strategy designed
more to shape the third party's claim within coverage than to minimize
loss, and his presence might improve the quality of defense.
It has been assumed so far that once judgment has been entered for
the third party, the insurer may not reopen the factual basis of the judg-
ment in defending an action on the policy.28 Although judgment rules are
sometimes cited as authority for this limitation,2 neither collateral estoppel
nor res judicata would seem strictly applicable, for "the rendition of a
judgment in an action does not conclude parties to the action who are not
adversaries under the pleadings as to their rights inter se upon matters
which they did not litigate, or have an opportunity to litigate, between
themselves." 0 The real reason for the limitation lies in the insurance
policy itself. The insurer agrees "to pay all sums which the insured
becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of injury caused by
28 Cf. Continental Cas. Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 27, 366 P.2d 455, 17
Cal. Rptr. 12 (1961).
27 See Magoun v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 346 Mass. 677, 195 N.E.2d 514 (1964).
28 See generally 8 APPLEMAN, op. cit. supra note 3, § 4860. Compare UNiFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607(5) :
Where the buyer is sued for breach of a warranty or other obligation for
which his seller is answerable over (a) he may give his seller written notice
of the litigation. If the notice states that the seller may come in and defend
and that if the seller does not do so he will be bound in any action against
him by his buyer by any determination of fact common to the two litigations,
then unless the seller after seasonable receipt of the notice does come in and
defend he is so bound.
29 See, e.g., Shelby Mut. Cas. Co. v. Richmond, 185 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 931 (1951); Dally v. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers'
Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 374 Pa. 476, 97 A.2d 795 (1953).
30 RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 82, at 384-85 (1942); cf. id. § 111; Newfane v.
Merchants Mut. Cas. Co., 10 Misc. 2d 163, 169 N.Y.S.2d 576 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
[Vo1.114:734
INSURER'S DUTY TO DEFEND
accident . . . ." The judgment in the action between the third party
and the insured, of course, would show conclusively, absent collusion, that
the insured has become "legally obligated." It would also seem to be
conclusive within the meaning of the policy as to the legal and factual
basis of why the insured has become "legally obligated." 31 If, for example,
the third party had secured a judgment based on a claim of negligence, the
insurer certainly could not argue that it should not be required to indemnify
the insured because in fact the third party had been contributorily
negligent.3 2 Even if the insurer could show that the third party had been
contributorily negligent, the insured would still remain "legally obligated"
to satisfy the prior judgment.,3 Similarly, an insurer's offer to disprove
31 E.g., Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 208 F. Supp. 20, 27 (D.
Kan. 1962) ; Wilhide v. Keystone Ins. Co., 195 F. Supp. 659, 662 (M.D. Pa. 1961)
("the defendant here is now concluded by the judgment in the prior suit so far as
it determined the cause of the injury, the amount of damages sustained and the lia-
bility of the insured"); Geddes & Smith, Inc. v. Saint Paul-Mercury Indem. Co.,
51 Cal. 2d 558, 334 P.2d 881 (1959) (Traynor, J.) (judgment included additional
elements of damages outside the policy for which insurer would not be liable).
A difficult case is one in which the third party seems to anticipate a policy exclu-
sion for intentional injuries. Thus a third party might base his action on negligence,
even though the insured was convicted of a criminal charge of which wrongful intent
was a necessary element. If the third party is content to restrict his claim to negli-
gence, the insurer might be concluded by a judgment within the policy. See Gould v.
Country Mut. Cas. Co., 37 I1. App. 2d 265, 185 N.E.2d 603 (1962). An action for de-
claratory judgment on the issue of primary coverage before the third party's action has
been completed would probably be held premature. Green v. Aetna Ins. Co., 349 F.2d
919 (5th Cir. 1965) ; see Harbin v. Assurance Co. of America, 308 F.2d 748 (10th Cir.
1962). Contra, Stout v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 201 F. Supp. 647 (M.D.N.C.),
aff'd, 307 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1962) ; see Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Hall, 246 F.
Supp. 64 (E.D.S.C. 1965); Federated Mut. Implement & Hardware Ins. Co. v.
Gupton, 241 F. Supp. 509 (E.D.S.C. 1965).
Three ways of attacking any judgment that the insured may suffer might be open
to the insurer. In an action on the policy, a court might be persuaded to make an inde-
pendent finding of fact, in disregard of the prior judgment and in recognition of the
insurer's extraordinary position. See Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hammer,
177 F.2d 793 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 914 (1950), 4 OKLA. L. REV.
125 (1951); Weis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 242 Minn. 141, 64 N.W.2d 366
(1954); Vaksman v. Zurich Gen. Acc. & Liab. Ins. Co., 172 Pa. Super. 588, 94 A.2d
186 (1953). However, the insurer's position actually is not so different from any
case in which it maintains that a prior court misconstrued the facts. See Farm
Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hammer, mupra at 802 (dissenting opinion). A
second way might be to persuade a court, in an action on the policy, to give some
effect to the criminal judgment as well as the civil judgment. See Smith v. An-
drews, 54 Ill. App. 2d 51, 203 N.E.2d 160 (1964) (overruling Gould v. Country
Mut. Cas. Co., stupra). See generally MAGUIRE, WEINSTEIN, CHADBoUTRN & MANS-
FIELD, CASES ON EVIDENCE 539-41 (5th ed. 1965). A recent Pennsylvania case held
that the record of a defendant's prior criminal conviction conclusively established the
fact of the defendant's extortion for purposes of a civil suit. Hurtt v. Stirone, 416 Pa.
493, 206 A.2d 624, cert. denied, 381 U.S. 925 (1965). The soundest approach in an
action on the policy, though, would be to pinpoint precisely what the prior judgment
established. Thus, if the third party's judgment were based on negligence alone, the
prior court may only have decided that as between negligence and nonnegligence the
insured had been negligent. If that court did not decide that as between negligence
and intentional tort the insured had been only negligent, a court in an action on the
policy ought to be free to decide whether the insured had committed an intentional
tort. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Ratliff, 242 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
32 Howe v. Howe, 87 N.H. 338, 179 AtI. 362 (1936).
33 See Hoffine v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 191 Kan. 63, 379 P.2d 246 (1963)
(insurer precluded from maintaining that since insured had not been properly served
with process, judgment was a nullity).
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an agency relationship, already established to hold the insured liable by
respondeat superior, would be rejected in an action on the policy.
3 4
The next question is how may the insurer show that the grounds of
judgment were outside the policy. Although the insurer's duty to defend
is determined solely by reference to the third party's complaint, this test
cannot be used to determine the grounds of a judgment, for there may
have been an unchallenged variance or a multiple count complaint may
have developed into a judgment outside the policy. Therefore, together
with the complaint, any jury charge,35 opinion and transcript would seem
relevant. It is not clear whether other items of evidence would be ad-
missible. In some cases witnesses who testified in the third party's suit
have been permitted to testify in a later action on the policy without objec-
tion from counsel.36 However, since the issue is on what factual and
legal grounds the prior court entered judgment, new witnesses should not
be permitted to testify, for their testimony would be relevant only to what
actually happened rather than to what the prior court has found happened.37
An exception might occur if a consent or default judgment more closely
resembled a settlement than an ordinary judgment.
Before discussing settlements, a comment should be made on what a
judgment is not competent to prove. In a recent case the insurer had
refused to defend under a homeowner's policy because it claimed that the
insured's property was being used for business purposes contrary to the
conditions of coverage.3 8  The insured, after losing to the third party, sued
both for defense costs and the amount of judgment. Summary judgment
for the insured was sustained on appeal. The court said that "if the insured
[sic] has notice of an action against the insured with respect to liability
which the injury claim shows to be covered by the policy, a judgment will
be conclusive whether the insurer defends or not." 39 The case seems
34 Dally v. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 374 Pa.
476, 97 A.2d 795 (1953); Jusiak v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 11 N.J. Misc. 869,
169 Ati. 551 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
35 E.g., Saragan v. Bousquet, 322 Mass. 14, 75 N.E.2d 649 (1947) (jury charge
admissible to show whether the jury had found that the third party was the insured's
servant or social guest). Contra, Stefus v. London & Lancashire Indem. Co., 111
NJ.L. 6, 166 Ati. 339 (Ct. Err. & App.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 657 (1933) (jury
charge not admissible to support insurer's defense that injury was willful where suit
alleged "carelessness, negligence and recklessness").
38In Sheehan v. Goriansky, 321 Mass. 200, 72 N.E.2d 538 (1947), the precise
ground of the insured's legal obligation to the third party could not readily be deter-
mined. Judgment had been entered on a verdict returned by a jury charged with
finding whether or not there had been a "willful, wanton or reckless" injury, and
willful injuries were excluded from coverage. In an action on the policy, a finding
was made based on the prior record and the testimony of Goriansky to which no
objection was made.
37 If new witnesses should not be permitted to testify, it may follow that the
possibility of new testimony from a prior witness should be enough not to permit a
prior witness to testify. In any event, an exception, of course, would be a case in
which the insurer defends an action on the policy on the ground that the prior court's
findings were distorted by collusion between the insured and the third party. Conwell
v. Indiana Ins. Co., 334 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1964).
38 McFadyen v. North River Ins. Co., 62 Ill. App. 2d 164, 209 N.E.2d 833 (1965).
39 209 N.E.2d at 836.
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wrong. Since a judgment would not be conclusive as to whether the in-
surer had been seasonably notified,40 it should not be conclusive as to other
questions based on other policy provisions not dealing with the liability of
the insured to a third party.4 ' Certainly the third party usually has no
proper interest in alleging that an insured defendant has paid all his pre-
miums or that the insured's premises were not being used for business
purposes. 42 If this bar to the insurer's policy defenses was a penalty for
wrongly refusing to defend, the case also seems unsupportable.43 The court
suggested that the insurer could have protected itself by instituting an
action for a declaratory judgment or by defending under a reservation of
rights. 44 However, if the insurer's contention were valid, the insured could
not be said to have been hurt since he in no way could have been misled
by any position that the insurer assumed. Therefore, the timing of the
judicial determination as to whether the insured had been using his prem-
ises for business purposes should not have been thought controlling.
III. SETTLEMENTS
Settlements raise the same 45 and more problems. If the insured
settles with the third party after the insurer has declined to defend, the
basis of the insured's legal obligation is not fixed in a trial record. In one
sense the basis of the insured's liability is what he or his attorney who
negotiated the settlement thought it was. Mr. Justice Holmes wrote that
"a sum paid in the prudent settlement of a suit is paid under the compulsion
of the suit as truly as if it were paid upon execution." 46 The question here
is why the sum is paid. If the insurer has refused to defend a claim within
40 E.g., Sussman v. American Sur. Co., 345 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1965); Muncie
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 74, 116 S.E.2d 474 (1960).
41Although there might be some question as to whether the insurer or the in-
sured had the burden of proof of a breach, see Comment, Insurance-Burden of Proof
in Insurance Exception Clauses-Pleading, 40 N.C.L. R-v. 138 (1961), the issue of
a breach would not seem to be foreclosed.
42 See University Club v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 124 Pa. Super. 480,
189 At. 534 (1937), as interpreted in Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Hilderbrandt, 119
F.2d 291, 301 (10th Cir. 1941) (dissenting opinion).
43 See text accompanying notes 25-26 supra.
44 The suggestion was made by way of approval of Sims v. Illinois Nat'l Cas.
Co., 43 Ill. App. 2d 184, 193 N.E.2d 123 (1963), in which it was said: "In cases of
doubt the answer is simple. [The insurer] can (1) seek a declaratory judgment as
to its obligations and rights or (2) defend under a reservation of rights." Id. at 199,
193 N.E.2d at 130. However, there is some question whether an action for declaratory
judgment would lie in Illinois. See McKenna, The Insurer's Dilemma: Defend Under
a Non-Waiver or Disclaim and Pray, 52 ILL. B.J. 918, 919 (1964). Furthermore,
the insured has no obligation to permit the insurer to defend under a reservation of
rights. E.g., Magoun v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 346 Mass. 677, 195 N.E.2d 514 (1964).
4 5 Cf. Theodore v. Zurich Gen. Acc. & Liab. Ins. Co., 364 P.2d 51 (Alaska 1961),
in which the insurer's liability for the amount of a settlement was said to follow from
its failure to defend, "for that which is paid in a prudent settlement of an action for
damages is something which the insured has 'become legally obligated to pay' within
the meaning of the insurance policy. Zurich became liable for the amount of the
judgment because this was the natural consequence of its breach . . . ." Id. at 55-56.
46 St. Louis Dressed Beef & Provision Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 201 U.S. 173,
182 (1906) (Holmes, J.).
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the policy and the insured has settled, the insurer has the burden of showing
that the settlement does not represent a legal obligation within the policy
or that the amount of settlement was not reasonable.4 7 If the third party's
complaint contained alternative claims only one of which was within the
policy, the insurer has the burden of showing that the legal obligation was
on grounds outside the policy.48
To evaluate these approaches, it is necessary to identify the com-
promises that compose a settlement and to consider the possible conse-
quences of a different approach. If the third party's claim appeared from
the complaint to be partly within and partly outside the policy, the settle-
ment figure might very well be influenced by an aggregate of the probabili-
ties of losing on grounds within the policy and those of losing on grounds
outside the policy plus the probability of paying high litigation expenses.49
On the one hand, since the insurer agrees to indemnify the insured for his
legal obligations arising "because of injury" within the description of
coverage, the insurer should pay no more than the sum of the dollar
figures assignable to those of the various grounds for settlement within
the policy. On the other hand, if the insurer were permitted to offer
evidence in support of such an assignment, the effect might be that the
insured would be less willing to settle a claim, unless he were confident
that he could later show that the grounds of the settlement were within
the policy or unless the risk of a high judgment outweighed the risk that
the claim might fall outside the policy. This objection, however, cannot
be fully accepted because if the insurer were not permitted to introduce
evidence for the purpose of assigning the settlement figure to specific
grounds, not only would policy coverage, in effect, be extended but the
insured might be more willing to accept a high offer of settlement from
the third party to avoid the risk of a trial that would result in a judgment
on grounds clearly outside the policy.
A middle way seems best. If the insurer is given the opportunity
and burden of proving that the settlement, or an identifiable portion of the
settlement, must have been made on grounds outside the policy, there would
be a check on the insured and at the same time the tendency otherwise to
discourage settlements would be minimized, since the insurer's burden
would be heavy. One case illustrates many of the settlement problems and
seems to adopt this middle way.50 The third parties claimed (1) that
they had been slandered, (2) that they had been assaulted by the insured
47 E.g., Boutwell v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 175 F.2d 597 (5th Cir. 1949).
4 8 Cadwallader v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 396 Pa. 582, 152 A.2d 484 (1959) ;
cf. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 281 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1960) ;
Globe Indem. Co. v. Hansen, 231 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1956) (semble), reversing 127
F. Supp. 260 (D. Minn. 1954) (no distinction made between insurer's duty to defend
based on third party's allegations and obligation to pay settlement) ; Ripepi v. Ameri-
can Ins. Co., 234 F. Supp. 156 (W.D. Pa. 1964). But see Baker v. American Ins.
Co., 324 F.2d 748 (4th Cir. 1963).
49 See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 88 Ohio L. Abs. 129, 178
N.E.2d 613 (Ct App. 1961).
50 Employers Mut Liab. Ins. Co. v. Hendrix, 199 F.2d 53 (4th Cir. 1952).
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landowner's game warden, and (3) that the assault was at the direction
of the insured. The insurer refused to defend because the policy covered
only accidental bodily injury and excluded intentional injuries inflicted at
the direction of the insured. The insured's attorneys settled for a high
figure out of a fear of jury prejudice, but only after the third parties had
amended their complaint to delete any claim that the intentional injury
was at the direction of the insured.5 ' The appellate court found that the
insurer was liable for the insured's attorneys' fees, but reduced the liability
to a reasonable amount. The court remanded to allow an apportionment
to be made between damages for slander and damages for personal injury.
The court made no mention of any further apportionment between dam-
ages for personal injury within coverage and those excluded from coverage.
The lack of such an apportionment is consistent with placing the burden
on the insurer to show that an identifiable portion of the settlement of the
personal injury claims must have been made on grounds outside the policy,
for the insurer did not and could not so show.
5 2
IV. RESERVATIONS OF RIGHTS AND NONWAIVER AGREEMENTS
In some cases the insurer might avoid its dilemma by defending after
it has notified the insured that it is reserving certain policy defenses or
after the insured has agreed not to defeat its policy defenses by raising
waiver or estoppel. Both a reservation of rights and a nonwaiver agree-
ment amount to the same protection. When the insurer assumes the
insured's defense under a reservation of rights, the insured's acquiescence
is given the same effect as if he had entered into a bilateral nonwaiver
agreement. Under both, the insurer retains the right to press only an-
nounced policy defenses.
These devices might raise a problem of failure of consideration as well
as a question of professional ethics. If the third party's allegations re-
5 Apparently, the insured did not then inform the insurer of the amended com-
plaint and again tender the defense. The insured's failure to notify the insurer that
the third party's allegations, wholly outside coverage, have been amended to fall within
coverage has been held fatal to the insured's rights. Sussman v. American Sur. Co.,
345 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1965). Such a failure is a breach of the notification require-
ment in the policy and does not necessarily destroy an indemnitor-indemnitee relation-
ship absent that requirement. Compare Sussman v. American Sur. Co., mipra, with
Renschler v. Pizano, 329 Pa. 249, 198 AtI. 33 (1938), and Orth v. Consumers Gas
Co., 280 Pa. 118, 124 AtI. 296 (1924) (Moschzisker, C.J.). In Hendrix it was not
necessary to reach the issue as to what the consequences of the insured's failure to
notify the insurer of the third party's amendment were, and the court did not discuss
the issue, because the third party's allegations were partly within the policy even
before the amendment. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Hendrix, 199 F.2d 53, 56
(4th Cir. 1952).
52 On remand the propriety and reasonableness of the settlement were to be at
issue, and apparently the insured was to have the burden of proof. The court was
careful not to require a trial on the merits of third parties' claim. Yet placing the
burden of showing reasonableness on the insured would go far toward undermining
avoidance of a trial on the merits, unless the court was primarily concerned with the
fact that damages for both slander and personal injury, which apparently was slight,
were included in the settlement and under the facts of this case the burden switched
to the insured after the insurer had shown prima facie unreasonableness.
1966]
746 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
quired the insurer to defend, it is difficult to see what consideration is
offered to the insured for accepting a nonwaiver agreement.53 Indeed, con-
ducting his own defense might be to the insured's advantage. If he settled,
for example, he might be able to show more easily that the grounds of the
settlement were within policy coverage than if the insurer had defended and
developed the facts. The ethical problem is posed most sharply by the
argument that at a time when an attorney, retained by the insurer but repre-
senting the insured, advises the insured to agree to a nonwaiver agreement
or reservation of rights, the attorney may very well be advising the insured
against his best interests. Canon Six of the American Bar Association's
Canons of Ethics states, among other things, that "it is unprofessional to
represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts." 54 While the insurance policy it-
self might constitute the insured's consent to be represented by the insurer's
attorney,55 it could hardly be said that the policy contains a full disclosure
of the facts. Moreover, it is questionable whether the insurer's attorney
could make a full disclosure of the range of possible consequences and
probabilities such that a layman could give informed consent.
Although this type of problem does not seem to be explicitly recog-
nized in any rule of law affecting the rights of the insured and the insurer,
it may partially explain the strictness with which the courts interpret
nonwaiver agreements and notices of a reservation of rights. 6
V. THE REASONABLE INVESTIGATION RULE
Cases in which the third party's complaint on its face is outside the
policy have not yet been considered. The general rule would categorically
53 See, e.g., Magoun v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 346 Mass. 677, 195 N.E.2d 514 (1964).
In Newcomb v. Meiss, 263 Minn. 315, 116 N.W.2d 593 (1962), an insurer's attorney
defended the insured against a claim of negligence under both a nonwaiver agreement
and a reservation of rights. On appeal, the insurer's attorney unsuccessfully urged
as grounds for reversal of a judgment against the insured the trial judge's refusal to
instruct the jury on the issue of an intentional tort His theory apparently was that
if the insured were found liable for an intentional tort, he could not also be found negli-
gent The attorney explained that his apparent sacrifice of the insured's interests to the
insurer's was illusory since the statute of limitations for actions for intentional tort
had run. But the court observed that the trial court might have permitted an amend-
ment to the complaint under the circumstances.
If the insurer's attorney had prevailed, it is difficult to see how the insurer could
have set up the prior judgment of intentional tort as a defense to an action on the
policy, for there appears to be no consideration for the nonwaiver agreement since
there was no question of the insurer's defense obligation. Unless the reservation of
rights protected the insurer, it might then have been estopped to raise the defense of
noncoverage. Therefore, the insurer might have been in a better position not de-
fending. See Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Ratliff, 242 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
5 ABA, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS 3 (1957).
55 See ABA, OPINIONS OF THE COMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEV-
ANCES, Op. no. 282, at 591 (1957), reprinted with a comment in PEasiG, CASES
ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 168 (1965).
56 See Henry v. Johnson, 191 Kan. 369, 381 P.2d 538 (1963) (letter purporting
to reserve rights of insurer while it moved to vacate a judgment against the insured
held ineffective) ; Hawkeye Cas. Co. v. Stoker, 154 Neb. 466, 48 N.W.2d 623 (1951)
(nonwaiver agreement held premised on doubt as to coverage and therefore ineffec-
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deny that the insurer had any duty to defend in these cases, even if the
true facts were such that a more accurately framed complaint would be
within the policy.57 In response to such a case another rule has been
adopted in a few jurisdictions. That rule requires the insurer to conduct
a reasonable investigation into the facts before disclaiming a duty to defend,
unless it is willing to run the risk that a court would later charge it for
defense costs after determining that the actual facts were within coverage.5s
The reasonable investigation rule has been roundly criticized as an
unjustified departure from the insurance contract 5 9 The argument against
the rule runs as follows. According to the standard duty to defend provi-
sion, the insurer agrees to defend any suit against the insured "alleging
such injury." "Such" refers to the description of injuries liability for
which is indemnified in the primary coverage provision. There is no
mention of any bearing that the actual facts or the merits of the third
party's claim are to have on the duty to defend. Indeed, the provision
emphasizes that only the allegations are controlling by including the
unnecessary clause "even if such suit is groundless, false or fraudulent."
Ordinarily, the argument would conclude, where a contract is this clear
courts would feel constrained not to substitute their private notions of fair
dealing for the parties' agreed bargain.60
VI. CONSTRUCTION OF THE DUTY To DEFEND PROVISION
But this judicial restraint need not be accepted as absolute. For many
types of coverage, the insurance buyer has in reality no opportunity to
negotiate over the terms of the contract, since terms are standardized.
tive when insurer disclaimed coverage completely and instituted action for declaratory
judgment); Welch, Reservation of Rights and Declaratory Judgments, 1954 INs. L.J.
65; Note, Insurance Company's Dilemma: Defending Actions Against the Assured,
2 STAN. L. REV. 383, 384-88 (1950).
57E.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Newsom, 352 S.W2d 888 (Tex. 1961).
58 See cases cited in note 80 infra; text accompanying notes 80-84 infra.
59 See, e.g., Loftin v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 106 Ga. App. 287, 297, 127
S.E.2d 53, 60 (1962) (dissenting opinion) ; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Newsom, 352 S.W.2d
888 (Tex. 1961). See also Cahoon, Company's Duty To Defend-Recent Develop-
ments, 1961 Ixs. L.J. 151.
60 "It is well-settled that words or terms in an insurance policy, like the words
or terms used in any other contract, are to be construed according to their plain,
ordinary and accepted sense in the common speech of man unless it appears from the
policy that a different meaning is intended." Ness v. National Indem. Co., 247 F.
Supp. 944, 948 (Alaska 1965). (Emphasis added.)
The argument might also include a defense of the reasonableness of the provision
as written. It is reasonable that the insurer not be "required to defend if it would not
be held bound to indemnify the defendant in the action if the plaintiff prevailed upon
the allegations of the declaration." Fessenden School, Inc. v. American Mut. Liab.
Ins. Co., 289 Mass. 124, 130, 193 N.E. 558, 561 (1935). Were the scheme of defense
coverage otherwise, the insurer would have to anticipate amendments to the pleadings
or variances and would, in effect, be forced to place itself in a better position to know
the nature of the third party's claim than the third party himself. Cf. Roos, supra
note 12, at 209-11. Even if the third party did amend, it would be time enough then
for the duty to attach. However, this argument depends for much of its force on
strict pleading requirements which might be an assumption contrary to fact. See text
accompanying notes 4-6 supra.
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The buyer must either accede to these terms or do without insurance
altogether. An agreement entered into in such circumstances has been
denominated an adhesion contract by one court 61 which concluded that the
disparity of the parties' bargaining power made it appropriate to relieve
the weaker party-the consumer-from the operation of those contract
terms which exhibited overreaching by the stronger party. The question
is whether the adhesive qualities of a liability insurance policy justify the
degree of departure from the duty to defend provision necessary to support
the reasonable investigation rule.6 2 To identify those adhesive qualities, it
is necessary to probe the bargaining context and the workings of the duty
to defend provision. To this end, a distinction will be made between the
objectives of the insurer, the expectations of the insured and the wording
of the policy. Examining the interaction of the three factors helps to ex-
pose the degree of adhesiveness, which in turn appears to be the unarticu-
lated underpinning of the reasonable investigation rule.
As to the insured's expectations, it is safe to assume that if the ordi-
nary insurance consumer had thought about them, his expectations would
be that the insurer would defend him whenever there was a threat of liability
to him and the threat was based on facts within the policy. The insured
probably would be surprised at the suggestion that defense coverage might
turn on the pleading rules of the court that a third party chose or on how
the third party's attorney decided to write the complaint. In some cases
the insured might think in terms of his own conduct. The bar owner, for
example, might well think that he is insulated from any legal expense
arising from injuries to patrons so long as he personally does not inten-
tionally injure someone or tell an employee to do so.6 3 To him the pos-
sibility of an ambitious claimant who would begin a lawsuit with a charge
of intentional injury for the sake of a favorable bargaining position and
later be willing to abandon that charge for one of simple negligence might
not occur; or if the possibility did occur the insured might not pause to
consider whether it would be fatal to part of his insurance coverage. In
short, the limits of the phrase "suits alleging such injury," prepared by
lawyers, defended by lawyers and authoritatively interpreted by lawyers,
are probably not appreciated by the lay insured. And even the more
sophisticated insured has no choice in the matter, since the provision is
standard.
The insurer's objectives, which are deducible from its written contract,
also deviate from the duty to defend provision, but in a different way. The
insurer's purpose is to protect its own interest by assuring itself of a
vigorous defense in those cases in which it would be required to pay any
judgment suffered by the insured. To be safe it also intends and obligates
61 See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) ;
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, comment.
62 See also First Ins. Co. v. Chapman, 255 F.2d 49, 53 (9th Cir. 1965) (dissent) ;
Note, 5 SANTA CLARA LAw. 60 (1964).
63 See McGettrick v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 264 F.2d 883, 886 (2d Cir. 1959)
(dictum) ; Loftin v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 106 Ga. App. 287, 295, 127 S.E.2d
53, 58 (1962) (dittum).
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itself to defend groundless, false and fraudulent suits in which there is
a low probability of losing but in which the insurer has a contractual
obligation to pay off if liability results.64 The most probable reason why
this intention is linked with the third party's allegations is that those
allegations for the most part accurately predict the grounds of any judg-
ment the third party might gain. However, for allegations to be an ac-
curate mode of predicting the grounds of any judgment, a pleading system
in which the allegations would always pose and limit the factual and legal
conclusions that a judgment could embody would have to exist. But no
pleading system operates with sufficient precision to predict accurately
insurance coverage. The duty to defend provision recognizes this lack of
precision by including groundless suits within its scope. Yet the general
rule presupposes the existence of this nonexistent pleading model. Even
if the test of measuring the duty to defend solely by reference to the third
party's allegations is implicit in the words "alleging such injury," the test
does not give exhaustive effect to the insurer's objectives. This short-
coming in the test becomes apparent when a pleading system is posited
which requires no factual allegations and provides for notice of the factual
basis of a claim or defense only by such depositions as either party wanted
to take." The duty to defend provision would be rendered meaningless,
yet there would be no doubt that the insurer's objectives would remain the
same. The insurer would probably exercise discretion and offer the benefit
of its defense to the insured in those cases which as far as it could predict
would result in a judgment within the primary coverage. In fact, it would
seem that the insurer exercises this same discretion under existing plead-
ing systems, for there are relatively few reported cases in which the insurer
has refused to defend a suit that has proceeded to a judgment which it was
then obligated to pay.66 What is happening, then, is that the insurer can
use the discrepancy between its objectives and the language of the duty to
defend provision to withhold the benefit of a defense from the insured when
it appears that the third party will lose and the third party's complaint on
its face is outside the policy, even though the factual basis of the third
party's claim is within the policy; and the insurer can use this discrepancy
to minimize its costs if it does inaccurately predict that any money judg-
ment the third party gains will be outside the policy.
6 See Comment, 10 Vm.. L. Rav. 558 (1965).
65 Compulsory arbitration procedures approach the hypothetical pleading system
posited, for after a case has been referred to arbitration there is no opportunity or
need for amendments to the pleadings. See Comment, Compulsory Arbitration, 2
Vim. L. REv. 529 (1957). See also 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1117, 1121 n.34 (1965). An-
other analogue is suggested by a recent Kansas case. In Henry v. Johnson, 191
Kan. 369, 381 P.2d 546 (1963) (4 to 3 decision), the court held in the alternative
that even though, contrary to a policy requirement, the insured had failed to forward
the third party's complaint to the insurer, the investigation that the insurer had in
fact conducted supplied sufficient notice to bind the insurer. See also Watters v.
American Ins. Co., 185 Cal. App. 2d 776, 8 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1960) (insurer disclaimed
before third party's complaint was filed).
66 Journal Pub. Co. v. General Cas. Co., 210 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1954) ; Kelly v.
United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 76 So. 2d 116 (La. Ct App. 1954).
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Ordinarily where one party has this sort of advantage, a court will
not intervene. Both parties are held to their bargain. But as Professor
Morris has pointed out in another context, there is a striking contrast be-
tween the sophistication of a nineteenth century entrepreneur having
marine insurance written and that of an automobile driver purchasing
liability insurance. 67 In fact, if one were forced to make comparisons,
the concept of a contract being the result of two parties bargaining until
they reach an agreement that can be set down in a memorandum would
not match up very closely with a typical insurance purchase. Rather the
insurance policy is closer to the so-called "adhesion contract." 68 Where a
term of a contract for a consumer product is uniform and in application
"unconscionable" due to the superior bargaining power of the seller so
that an individual consumer must either "adhere" to the unconscionable
term or do without the product, courts as a matter of public policy might
not enforce the term.69 The liability insurance policy, however, falls some-
where between an adhesion contract, in this its most pejorative sense,70
and a normal contract, because not all of the disfavored adhesion elements
are present. Conspicuously missing is unconscionableness, unless it can
be equated with isolated disappointment or hardship. Furthermore, while
uniformity resulting from oligopolistic bargaining power might in general
be undesirable, uniformity in insurance carriers' terms has virtue, for
it is only by pooling data drawn from identical insurance contracts that
insurers can most accurately predict risks and set rates accordingly.71
But the force of the adhesion doctrine is not completely spent by the
above considerations. The fact remains that the insured is probably misled.
The discrepancy between the results that the technical term "alleging"
purports to dictate and the insured's expectations works to his disad-
vantage. 72 Even assuming the insured has greater than average legal
i07 Morris, supra note 15, at 925-28.
68 See Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 CoLum. L.
Rlv. 1072 (1953) ; Kessler, Forces Shaping the Insurance Contract, 1954 Ixs. L.J. 151.
69 See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
70 That is, the Henningsen sense. In Henningsen, supra note 69, the court held
an automobile manufacturer's disclaimer of liability beyond the minimal amount as-
sumed in a warranty insufficient to bar a personal injury claim. In another sense, the
theory of an adhesion contract may underlie the familiar canon of construction that
any ambiguities in an insurance contract are resolved against the insurer. However,
these two senses of the term may tend to merge. See 6A CoRBiN, CONTRACrS § 1376,
at 21 (1962) : "Standardized contracts, such as insurance policies, drafted by powerful
commercial units and put before individuals on the 'accept this or get nothing' basis,
are carefully scrutinized by the courts for the purpose of avoiding enforcement of
'unconscionable' clauses. At times this avoidance is effected by a process of pseudo
'interpretation'; at other times by refusing to permit successful 'overreaching.'"
71 Compare Kulp, The Rate-Making Process in Property and Casualty Insurance
-Goals, Technics, and Limits, 15 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 493 (1950). It has also
been suggested that standardization promotes consumer understanding of the policy.
Hedges, Improving Property and Casualty Insurance Coverage, 15 LAW & CONTFEMP.
PROn. 352, 357-61 (1950).
72 Cf. Meyer, Contracts of Adhesion and the Doctrine of Fundamental Breach,
50"VA. L. REV. 1178, 1187 (1964) : "To the extent that these clauses anticipate future
controversy and provide a machinery for settling disputes, they are in the best tradi-
tion of legal planning. . . . When not bargained for, however, they invite disfavor
as an attempt by one party to make himself judge in his own case."
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sophistication and therefore is not misled, he still has no choice in buying
insurance; he must sacrifice full defense coverage to his primary need for
indemnity. The objectionable feature of this lack of choice is that the
insurer is in no way hurt by this discrepancy. Indeed, the insurer benefits
for it can fulfill its objectives by offering to defend in cases where the risk
of a sizable liability within the policy is high. The insured gains a cor-
responding benefit when the insurer does actually defend, even if under
a reservation of rights; but relative to his expectations the correspondence
is erratic.
judicial opinions in cases departing from the general rule have fared
badly in articulating a rationale for the departure and indeed have been
notable for the absence of any thorough going justification. One of the
earliest courts which was willing to look beyond the third party's allega-
tions apparently thought that any construction of the policy which did not
require the insurer to defend suits against the insured which could result
in liability within the policy was simply unfair.73 Moreover, there is some
indication in the opinion that the court failed to distinguish between the
insurer's obligation to indemnify under the primary coverage provision and
its obligation to defend under the duty to defend provision and thought
that the former could not apply without the latter.74
More recently, in Milliken v. Fidelity & Cas. Co.,75 a federal court
applied the reasonable investigation rule, even though the state whose law
it was Erie-bound to follow had adopted the general rule. The one fact
the court considered crucial was that after the third party had instituted
his action in the state court, the insured defendant removed to federal court.
The court then stated that since the state courts had only passed on
insurers' duty to defend state suits, this case was one of first impression
because the state courts required fact pleading and the federal courts
notice pleading.7 6 Since "the pleadings are not a rigid and unchangeable
73 Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Hilderbrandt, 119 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1941)
(unanimous decision for insurer became 2 to 1 decision for insured after rehearing).
74 Id. at 299.
75 338 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1964).
76 Id. at 39-40. But cf. United Serv. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 973 (1964) (federal court to abstain from interpreting
term in an insurance policy until state court passes on question, where state law was
uncertain). Case law development in Pennsylvania lends support to the Milliken
court's analysis of the Erie problem. Precedent in Pennsylvania was similar to that
in Kansas, the state of Milliken's forum. Compare Wilson v. Maryland Cas. Co.,
377 Pa. 588, 105 A.2d 304 (1954) (third party's complaint in state court fixed claim
outside the policy: no duty to defend), 103 U. PA. L. Rzv. 445 (1954), with Leonard
v. Maryland Cas. Co., 158 Kan. 263, 146 P.2d 378 (1944). In Cadwallader v. New
Amsterdam Cas. Co., 396 Pa. 582, 152 A.2d 484 (1959), the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court seemed receptive, in dictum, to distinguishing the Wilson case on the grounds
that the third party's action against the insured in Cadwallader was instituted in
federal court which had more liberal pleading rules. Id. at 591, 152 A.2d at 489. In
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 281 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1960), the
federal court in applying Pennsylvania law reasoned along the lines of Milliken but
did not have to reach explicitly the question as to whether a reasonable investigation
rule applied. Milliken then is similar to Pittsburgh Plate Glass without Cadwallader.
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blueprint of the rights of the parties," 77 and since the duty to defend
could "attach at any stage in the litigation," 78 the court concluded that
any "facts, extraneous to the allegations of the pleadings, which, if proved,
make out a case against the insurer [sic] that is covered by the policy and
which either are actually brought to the insurer's attention or could have
been discovered by it through a reasonable investigation" determine the
insurer's duty to defend.79 Even granting the plasticity of federal pleading,
the court failed to answer explicitly why it could hold that the insurer has
a duty to defend against complaints clearly outside the policy when the
insurance contract provides only that the duty attaches in suits "alleging
such injury."
VII. How THE REASONABLE INvESTIGATION RULE OPERATES
As the reasonable investigtaion rule is now developing, the require-
ment of an investigation tends to fulfill the insured's expectations, for the
net result is that the insurer's liability for the insured's defense costs is
decided on the basis of the actual facts. If the insurer relied solely on the
third party's allegations to conclude that it had no duty to defend, courts
so far have enforced this required investigation by supplying a judicial
finding of fact for the investigation that the insurer did not make. 0 If
the finding of fact is within the policy, the insurer must reimburse the
insured for the reasonable expense of his defense. Thus, the insurer
which does not investigate is precluded from maintaining that an investiga-
tion could just as reasonably have concluded that the facts were outside
77 Quoting from Harbin v. Assurance Co. of America, 308 F2d 748, 750 (10th
Cir. 1962).
78 Milliken v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 338 F.2d 35, 40 (10th Cir. 1964).
79 Ibid.
8 0 Ibid.; American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
283 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1960); McGettrick v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 264 F.2d 883 (2d
Cir. 1959) ; Loftin v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 106 Ga. App. 287, 127 S.E.2d 53
(1962); Pendleton v. Pan. Am. Fire Cas. Co., 317 F2d 96 (10th Cir.) (dictum),
order modified, 326 F.2d 760 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 905 (1963);
Harbin v. Assurance Co. of America, 308 F.2d 748 (10th Cir. 1962) (seinble);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Newsom, 352 S.W.2d 888, 896 (Tex. 1961) (dissenting opinion).
In other cases the facts were known to the insurer; therefore the question of an
investigation was not reached. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Hilderbrandt, 119 F.2d
291 (10th Cir. 1941); Hagen Supply Corp. v. Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 331 F.2d
199 (8th Cir. 1964) (dictum); see Albuquerque Gravel Prods. Co. v. American
Employers Ins. Co., 282 F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1960) (insured failed to prove facts
were within the policy); cf. State ex rel. Inter-State Oil Co. v. Bland, 354 Mo.
622, 190 S.W.2d 277 (1945) (policy worded differently but case did not turn on
difference); Marshall's U.S. Auto Supply, Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 354 Mo. 455,
189 S.W.2d 529 (1945) (dictum) (policy worded differently). See also Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 281 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1960); University
Club v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 124 Pa. Super. 480, 189 AtI. 534 (1937). In
still other cases the rule has been formulated in terms of whether the insurer knew
or was informed by the insured of the actual facts. Crum v. Anchor Cas. Co., 264
Minn. 378, 119 N.W.2d 703 (1963); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
122 F. Supp. 197 (D. Minn. 1954). This last formulation amounts to a requirement
of a reasonable investigation, since the insurer could not rely on what the insured
says the actual facts are and yet if the insured was correct in what he said the facts
were, he would recover his defense costs.
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the policy."' It is uncertain, however, whether the insurer is still so
precluded if it comes forward with proof that it actually conducted an
investigation that at the time tended to show that the facts were outside
the policy, when the insured is prepared to show that the actual facts were
within the policy.8 2 One court apparently carried that preclusion over to
such a case in holding that it was not error to exclude evidence which would
have tended to show that the insurer had acted reasonably in concluding
that facts dehors the third party's complaint were outside the policy.,
Instead, the question for the fact finder was what happened, to which
question the excluded evidence was not pertinent.84
That case, American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Southwestern Greyhound
Lines, Inc.,8 5 suggests that in practice the reasonable investigation rule is
of limited utility because it does not provide the insurer with any fixed
guide for its conduct. In Harbin v. Assurance Co. of America 8 6 the Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit tried to meet this limitation consistently
with American by adopting what amounts to a wait and see modification
of the reasonable investigation rule. Policy coverage in Harbin turned on
whether the insured had committed an intentional tort. Since no amount
of pretrial investigation could enable the insurer to predict with any cer-
tainty what a trier of fact would find on the issue of intent, the court
concluded that the insurer need not defend as of the time the third party's
complaint was filed and indeed could not defend initially because of a
conflict of interest. The implication in the case was that the duty to defend
could conceivably arise if the third party's claim changed so as to appear
to be within the policy.
8 7
81 See, e.g., McGettrick.v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 264 F.2d 883, 886 (2d Cir. 1959):
"Since the insurance company had not made the required investigation, the only
possible substitute for what its investigation would have shown is the jury's own
finding as to the merits of North's [the third party's] claim."
82 Compare American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
283 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1960), with Harbin v. Assurance Co. of America, 308 F.2d 748
(10th Cir. 1962).
83 American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc., supra
note 82. The factual issue in the case was whether the third party, a bus passenger,
was injured while alighting from a bus in a bus station and therefore within a policy
exclusion. The excluded evidence was the third party's complaint, her depositions
and those of another witness, and a judgment dismissing the bus station as a defendant
-all from the third party's action against the insured and all offered to show that
the insurer had reasonably concluded that the facts were within the exclusion and
thus outside the policy.
84 Ibid. At trial in the American case the jury apparently accepted the testimony
of some Greyhound (the insured) employees that the third party was injured not
while alighting from the bus. After the bus station had been dismissed as a defendant
in the third party's action against Greyhound, Greyhound settled. Therefore, there
was no prior finding of fact binding the American court, see notes 28-34 supra, and
accompanying text, unless the bus station's dismissal was on the grounds that any
injury sustained by the third party, the passenger, did not occur on the bus station's
platform and that dismissal could be taken as binding on the third party and the
insured. This possibility was not discussed by the American court. Cf. Leonardi v.
Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 212 F.2d 887 (2d Cir. 1954).
85 283 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1960).
86308 F.2d 748 (10th Cir. 1962).
87 The implication is by no means clear. The inference is drawn from the fact
that the court was careful to limit its judgment to the insurer's duty to defend and
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The procedural posture helps explain the decision. The third party
had filed a complaint alleging that the insured intentionally assaulted him.
The insured's position was that at most he had been negligent. In doubt
as to whether to defend, the insurer brought an action against the insured
for a declaratory judgment. While a declaratory judgment is an effective
device either for interpreting how provisions of an insurance policy apply
to a given set of facts or for determining whether the insured has breached
a requirement of the policy, it is unwieldy where the dilemma was caused
by a disputed issue of fact.s8 The court was understandably reluctant to
second-guess the outcome of the third party's action, for the issue was
not what the insured's state of mind actually was but rather what the
trier of fact in the third party's action would determine was the insured's
state of mind. If the court had resolved this issue of fact between the
insured and the insurer, res judicata would have barred retrying the issue
between them if the third party's action had come out the other way and
recovery on the policy were at issue. 9 The court concluded that the
insurer did not have a duty to defend when the complaint was filed.90
Two unnecessarily different versions of the reasonable investigation
rule might seem to be emerging in the Tenth Circuit. In Harbin, by
implication, a wait and see modification was adopted. Yet two years earlier
in American, another Tenth Circuit case, which the Harbin court decided
was distinguishable because of its procedural posture and hence not con-
did not include any adjudication of the insurer's liability for any judgment that the
insured might suffer. The court further limited its judgment by saying only that
the insurer "is not obligated at this time to defend .... " Id. at 750. (Emphasis
added.)
88 Compare Harbin v. Assurance Co. of America, 308 F.2d 748 (10th Cir. 1962),
with Bennett v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 132 So. 2d 788 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (issue
was whether allegations of injury from a dammed drainage ditch which flooded in a
rainstorm were allegations of an "accidental injury" within the meaning of the policy).
89 See Green v. Aetna Ins. Co., 349 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1965) (court ruled on
the insurer's duty to defend by applying the general rule but refused to rule on primary
coverage in advance of state trial determination) ; Continental Cas. Co. v. Reinhardt,
247 F. Supp. 173 (D. Ore. 1965). But see Stout v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co.,
201 F. Supp. 647 (M.D.N.C.), aff'd, 307 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1962). Recognizing
that coverage might be determined finally in the federal action for a declaratory judg-
ment, the third party might feel forced to present his case in that action. Therefore,
in effect, the state court plaintiff would be deprived of his choice of forum. See Green
v. Aetna Ins. Co., supra. Under the general rule, there is no necessity for joining the
third party in an action for declaratory judgment to determine the insurer's duty to
defend, for a direct action on the policy if and when one lies would be sufficient and
would be the most efficient utilization of courtroom time. See Hartford Acc. & Indem.
Co. v. Williamson, 216 A.2d 635 (Conn. 1966). The insurer might be able to accom-
plish the same goal, i.e., having one trial with all three parties, by intervening in
the third party's action against the insured under, for example, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 24. See Knapp v. Hankins, 106 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Ill. 1952) ; see gen-
erally Comment, Estoppel, Third Party Practice, and Insurer's Defenses, 19 U. CmI.
L. REv. 546 (1952). The infrequency with which this type of third party practice
appears in reports suggests that insurers are reluctant to identify themselves as a
possible real party in interest because of jury prejudice.
SO Harbin v. Assurance Co. of America, 308 F.2d 748 (10th Cir. 1962). See gener-
ally Note, Use of the Declaratory Judgment To Determine a Liability Insurer's Duty
To Defend--Conflict of Interests, 41 IND. L.J. 87 (1965).
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trolling,9 1 the insurer was held to what seemed to be as difficult a prediction
as the one the Harbin court rejected.92 The third party's allegations were
outside the policy and the insurer refused to defend, whereupon the insured
settled. In an action on the policy for the amount of the settlement and
defense costs, the actual facts were determined from conflicting testimony
and the court made an all or nothing decision on the insurer's duty to
defend. Since a reasonable investigation could have-not "would neces-
sarily have"--uncovered the actual facts, which were within the policy,
the insurer was liable for defense costs as well as the amount of settle-
ment.9 3 If the American court had taken an approach wholly consistent
with Harbin (assuming contrary to fact that American was subsequent to
Harbin), it might have been forced to decide that the insurer did not have
to defend until it appeared that a trier of fact would have found that the
facts were within the policy.9 4
The key to reconciling the two cases would seem to be the distinction
made earlier in the context of criticism of the rule requiring an insurer to
defend an ambiguous or multiple count complaint only until the third
party's claim is confined to grounds outside the policy.95 The duty to
defend can be broken down into two discrete components: the privilege
of controlling the actual defense and the obligation to pay defense costs.
The Harbin opinion can be read as saying no more than that the insurer
could not take control of the insured's defense unless it was willing to
waive any policy defense of non-coverage that it might have. The opinion
would seem not to foreclose the possibility that the insurer might still be
charged with all defense costs if in retrospect it could be concluded that a
reasonable investigation could have, and therefore should have, uncovered
91 The Harbin court said American. was "not controlling because . . . the action
sought to impose liability on the insurer after the facts had been established . .. .
308 F.2d at 749. But it has been pointed out that the facts in American "were not
established; they were in dispute at the time the insurer refused to defend the action,
just as they were in Harbin." Comment, 3 NATuRAL RESOURCES J. 185, 189 (1963).
The operative word in this quotation from Harbin then must be "after." It also
appears that if the insurer had actually defended in American, it would have faced as
much of a conflict of interest as the insurer would have in Harbin. The conflict
though would seem to be a moot point because the insurer would be estopped from
raising a defense of noncoverage, see, e.g., Pendleton v. Pan Am. Fire Cas. Co., 317
F.2d 96 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 905 (1963), order vnodified, 326 F.2d 760
(10th Cir. 1964), unless it defended under a reservation of rights or nonwaiver agree-
ment, in which event it still might have difficulty in establishing a defense of non-
coverage based on facts outside the policy, cf. Newcomb v. Meiss, 263 Minn. 315, 116
N.W.2d 593 (1962). But see Loftin v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 106 Ga. App. 287,
293, 127 S.E.2d 53, 59 (1962) (dictum).
92 See notes 83-84 mipra.
93 Harbin v. Assurance Co. of America, 308 F.2d 748 (10th Cir. 1962).
94 If the attachment of the duty to defend does depend on the timing of an apparent
change in the third party's claim, an administrative uncertainty would seem to remain.
If such a change in the third party's claim did become apparent through, for example,
an amendment in the pleadings to conform to the proof, it is unclear whether there
would be a midtrial change of counsel, an allocation of defense costs of some sort
between insurer and insured or some combination of the two.
95 See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
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facts within the policy.96 If that possibility is open, Harbin and American
are consistent.
If the two cases are read together in this way, it may be objected that
charging the insurer with knowledge of facts within the policy as a court
would later find them is not only in some cases an impossible standard
of conduct to which to hold the insurer but also might raise the insurer's
operating costs substantially more than the benefits to the insured are
worth. The actual expense of conducting a thorough investigation every
time an insured maintains that, contrary to a third party's allegations, the
factual basis of the threat of liability is within policy coverage could be
expected to raise costs. 7 While there is always a possibility of "accidental"
waiver or estoppel, the reasonable investigation rule might increase the
probability and thus increase costs also. The very proliferation of the
insurer's representatives coming into contact with the insured-claim in-
vestigators, the local sales agent and attorneys retained by the insurer-
increases the probability that one of them might mislead the insured so
that the insurer would be estopped from raising policy defenses. Moreover,
time spent actually investigating and arriving at a decision as to whether
to defend might have the same effect, if the insured were left right before
trial without counsel or the benefit of an investigator or negotiator.98
This objection to the reasonable investigation rule based on increased
costs, however, might be more imagined than real. The reasonable in-
vestigation rule creates no incentive for the insurer to increase investigation
costs over and above those it already assumes to further its objectives.
96 This reading of Harbin is not an easy one, but neither are any others. On the
one hand, the court said that American was not controlling. It also said: "The ulti-
mate question of the insurer's liability is not now before us as it was in Tenth Circuit
cases [including American] on which the insureds rely. If it should be determined
that the injuries for which the plaintiff [herein referred to as the third party] seeks
recovery in the state action were covered by the policy and not within its exclusionary
provisions, the insurer is liable to the insureds under the policy." 308 F.2d at 750.
This passage has been read as referring only to the insurer's liability for a judgment
within the policy and not to its obligation to pay defense costs. Comment, 3 NATURAL
RESOURCES J. 185, 192 (1963). Yet it seems just as susceptible to the reading that
the reference is to defense costs "under the policy" as well as the judgment, particu-
larly since the court purported to be acting in accord with American. On the other
hand, it seems unlikely that the court would have intended to mean, without making
an explicit distinction between the insurer's obligation to pay defense costs and its
right to assume control of the insured's defense, that although the insurer was not
obligated to defend "at this time," it might have to pay defense costs. The real
answer probably is that the court did not address itself to the problem because it
was unlikely to arise. A third party complaint had been filed against the insurer by
the insured in the state action, and the insured had already been convicted of criminal
assault, Comment, 3 NATURAL RESOURCES 3. 185, 186 (1963) (citing the record of
which action it is unclear and not indicating whether the insured pleaded guilty or
whether his pleading was relevant).
!7 Moreover, to avoid the necessity of consulting a lawyer at an early stage on
questions which might be beyond the competence of a lay claims investigator, see
DONALDSON, CASUALTY CLAIM PRACTICE 398-402 (1964); MAGARICK, SUCCESSFUL
HANDLING OF CASUALTY CLAIMS 193-202 (1955), and which might increase in fre-
quency, insurers might be more willing than otherwise to compromise claims, cf. Her-
mann, Legal Costs to Insurance Companies and How They Can be Reduced, 1964
INS. L.J. 137, reprinted in 6 LAw OFFICE EcoNoMIcs AND MANAGEMENT 201 (1965).
98 See Morris, Waiver and Estoppel in Insurance Policy Litigation, 105 U. PA.
L. REv. 925, 942-43 (1957).
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The assumption here is that, absent the reasonable investigation rule, the
insurer would fully investigate and vigorously defend any suit against the
insured, regardless of the allegations, if there were a high probability that
the suit would proceed to a large judgment within the policy.99 Even with
the reasonable investigation rule, the insurer could be expected not to
investigate fully or to defend a suit against the insured which, although
perhaps based on facts within the policy, has a low probability of proceeding
to a sizable judgment within the policy. The reasonable investigation rule
therefore serves not so much as a rule of conduct for the insurer to follow
as a method of fulfilling the insured's expectations. Some of the difficulties
in administering the rule are attributable to the fact that while courts feel
compelled to talk about the former function of the rule, their major con-
cern is in implementing the latter.
Costs other than the expenses of the insurer's investigations-the cost
of the insured's actual defense-are justifiable by an appeal to fairness.
It seems better to have the costs of any quirks that might arise in a third
party's suit absorbed by all rate payers evenly rather than by one insured.
Furthermore, although it might appear unfair to require the insurer to
decide whether to defend when the face of a third party's claim is outside
the policy and when the insurer might be estopped if despite its defense
the insured loses on grounds outside the policy, it still seems reasonable to
place the burden on the insurer to make these hard decisions. Expertise,
initially, resides with the insurer, and in a sense that expertise is part of
what the insurer is marketing. Moreover, it is not facetious to suggest
that the insurer have insurance for mistaken decisions in the sense that
added costs be passed on to all consumers.
VIII. A SYNTHESIS
When judicial approaches to the duty to defend, which are selected
without regard to the different jurisdictions, are put together, they begin to
fall into a coherent pattern. The pattern, of course, depends on the selec-
tion and is advanced here in the form of positive propositions only as a
prediction of the direction case law development should and might take.10 0
(1) The Standard of the Defense Obligation: The insurer's duty to defend
is determined by whether a third party's claim against the insured could
potentially proceed to a judgment covered by the policy. If any part or
any reading of the third party's allegations comes within the description
of the insured's liabilities that the insurer agrees to pay, then the insurer
9 See text accompanying notes 64-66 supra.
100 The reasonable investigation rule is included in this synthesis because the
insured who is abandoned by his insurer solely because of an idiosyncracy in a third
party's pleadings or in the pleading premise of the policy itself is a sympathetic figure;
and although the reasonable investigation rule is now a minority rule, as precedent
grows it most probably will be relied upon to handle the relatively few cases to which
it is applicable. See 7 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 429 (3d ed. Jaeger 1963), in which a
similar prediction is made, but in which it is suggested that the reasonable investigation
rule would affect the insurer's approach to many more cases.
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has a defense obligation. 1' 1 The insurer has the same obligation if a
"reasonable" 102 investigation does or would disclose facts within that
description. (2) Consequences of the Obligation: Regardless of the nature
of the third party's claim, if the insurer assumes the insured's defense,
1 3
the insurer has fulfilled its defense obligation and it must pay the amount of
judgment, 04 unless it has effectively reserved the right to contest coverage
by so notifying the insured. 1 5 Conversely, if the insurer does not defend,
its defense obligation, if it arises according to the above standard, is dis-
charged by reimbursing the insured for his defense costs. Independently
of whether the insurer must pay defense costs,0 6 it must pay the amount
of the insured's legal obligation to the third party if it is based on facts
within the description of coverage. If that legal obligation is in the form
of a judgment, the insurer may not show that the legal obligation is out-
side the policy description by facts inconsistent with the findings of fact
upon which the judgment was entered.lO 7 If the insurer's legal obligation
is in the form of a settlement, the insured must show that the settlement
was on grounds within the description of coverage, unless the insurer had
a defense obligation.' s If according to either the facts alleged or the facts
101 Cases cited note 9 supra.
102 "Reasonable" is here used as in American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Southwestern
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 283 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1960). An investigation is reasonable
only if it finds the facts as a court later does. See notes 80-84 supra and accompany-
ing text.
103 A temporary assumption of the defense will be treated as a complete assump-
tion, unless the ground of the third party's claim that created the insurer's defense
obligation was baseless and unless the insured was not prejudiced by the insurer's
withdrawal. This formulation is a compromise based on the textual discussion accom-
panying notes 11-23 supra.
304 The insurer must pay only the amount of the judgment up to the policy dollar
limits, unless the insurer's rejection of a prejudgment settlement offer for an amount
within the policy dollar limits violated some duty the insurer owed the insured. See
generally Gedeon v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 342 F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 1965);
Comunale v. Traders Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 358 P.2d 198 (1958) ; Keeton,
Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1136 (1954);
Note, Excess Liability: Reconsideration of California's Bad Faith Negligence Rule,
18 STAx. L. REv. 475 (1966).
105 An effective reservation of rights or non-waiver agreement permits the in-
surer to raise the insured's non-cooperation or failure seasonably to notify as a defense
to an action on the policy. However, it might be questioned whether a reservation of
rights or nonwaiver agreement would permit the insurer to defend an action on the
policy by proving facts inconsistent with those found by a court in determining the
insured's legal obligation to the third party, since the insured would remain "legally
obligated" to the third party for the reasons given and upon the facts found by a
prior court no matter what the insurer is able to prove. Cf. Comment, 19 U. CmI. L.
Rxv. 546, 549 (1952). If the insurer were permitted to prove facts inconsistent with
the prior judgment, the insured would seem to be waiving more than the opportunity
to raise waiver and estoppel against the insurer. He would also seem to be waiving
policy coverage. See text accompanying notes 53-55 supra.
106 See notes 24-26 supra and accompanying text.
107 See notes 28-43 supra and accompanying text
-10 If the defense obligation is determined by the reasonable investigation rule,
the insurer's liability for the settlement would seem automatic, since the same issue of
fact would determine the insurer's duty to defend as well as its obligation to pay the
settlement
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which would have been found through reasonable investigation the third
party's claim potentially could have proceeded to a judgment within the
description of coverage, the insurer can avoid liability for the settled
amount only by showing that the settlement must have been on grounds
outside the policy.I0 9
109 See notes 45-52 supra and accompanying text.
